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THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JURY
NANCY JEAN KING*
I
INTRODUCTION
The criminal jury, after its importation to North America by English settlers, evolved into a unique institution in the United States. Across the centuries, prominent features of American law and culture have left their mark on
the criminal jury: Americans’ distrust of the judiciary, their passion for open
procedures and unfettered public discourse about those procedures, their
struggle to overcome racial and ethnic injustice, their commitment to adversarial adjudication, and the dual state-federal justice system. This brief exposition will describe the American criminal jury generally, focusing on those aspects of that institution that distinguish it from juries in other parts of the
world.
II
THE CRIMINAL JURY IN THE NEW NATION
It was a highly publicized case from the colonial era, the trial of John Peter
Zenger, that is credited with “impress[ing] thousands of Americans with the
1
importance of the right to a jury as a bulwark against official oppression.” In
1734, Zenger, an American newspaperman, was charged by the British Crown
with the crime of seditious libel for mocking the Royal Governor, a widely de2
tested man named Cosby, in the New York Weekly Journal. Court officials
3
took pains to assure that the jury pool included supporters of Cosby, but some
of the veniremen were of Dutch ancestry and maintained anti-British senti4
ments. The jury chosen included a mariner, a brewer, a vintner, an artisan, a
baker, a merchant, a blacksmith, a carpenter, a currier, a tradesman, and a
5
clerk. An aging but renowned lawyer, Andrew Hamilton of Philadelphia, de-
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3. See id. at 41 (noting that the original panel, ultimately challenged by lawyers for Zenger, was
made up of Cosby appointees and friends).
4. See LIVINGSTON RUTHERFURD, JOHN PETER ZENGER, HIS PRESS, HIS TRIAL AND A
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5. See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER 210 n.56 (1963).
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fended Zenger. Barred by the judge from presenting witnesses who could testify as to the truth of what Zenger had published, Hamilton exhorted the jury,
“it is not the cause of a poor printer, nor of New York alone, which you are
now trying. No! It may in its consequence affect every freeman that lives under a British government on the main of America. It is the best cause. It is the
7
cause of liberty.” The jury acquitted Zenger, he was released, and news of the
8
trial spread throughout the colonies and to England.
Thirty years later, the British prosecuted American colonists for revenue
violations in admiralty courts without juries, rather than in common pleas
courts where juries could have acquitted and thus freed protesters. Trials for
treason were to be conducted in England, removing them entirely from the
9
scrutiny or participation of colonists. These practices helped to precipitate the
10
American Revolution; Thomas Jefferson stated in the Declaration of Independence that one of the reasons requiring separation from England was Brit11
ain’s conduct “depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.”
Even before the Declaration, each of the twelve states that had adopted a written constitution had included the right of the accused to a jury trial—“the only
12
right that these twelve constitutions declared unanimously.”
Not surprisingly, Article III of the Constitution of the United States, the
document establishing and limiting the power of the federal government, also
guarantees the right to a jury trial. It provides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes,
except in the Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be
13
held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” But this
assurance was not specific enough for some who feared federal tyranny. Patrick Henry, for example, argued that by selecting jurors “from any part of the
state,” the federal authorities “can hang anyone they please, by having a jury to
14
suit their purposes.” Others argued that the Constitution should include more
particular protections concerning the selection of jurors and the procedures
governing their deliberations. Ultimately, however, agreement upon the
“accustomed requisites” of the jury could not be reached because the jury prac-

6. See LEVY, supra note 2, at 41.
7. Id. at 42-43.
8. See id. at 44; Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 874 (1994) (“In the half-century between Zenger’s trial and
the ratification of the Sixth Amendment [a pamphlet account of the trial] was reprinted fourteen times.
More than any formal law book, it became the American primer on the role and duties of jurors.”).
9. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 875 (citing Edmund Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of
Brison, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 189, 192 (9th ed. 1889)).
10. See CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
209 (1960).
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20.
12. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 870; see also WILLIAM EDWARD NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 96 (1975).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
14. FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 25-26 (1951).
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15

tices among the states were too diverse. The Sixth Amendment provided
simply that a person accused of violating federal criminal law receive “a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer16
tained by law.”
III
A PATCHWORK OF JURY LAWS: THE LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES
For nearly two centuries, judges interpreted the jury provisions in Article
III and the Sixth Amendment to govern only prosecutions in the courts of the
United States for violations of federal criminal law. However, the number and
breadth of state crimes dwarfed the meager collection of federal crimes, and
only a tiny fraction of all criminal prosecutions took place in federal court. As
a result, the United States Constitution did not protect the majority of criminal
defendants—those who faced state criminal charges in the courts of the several
states. In state court the right to a jury trial depended upon not federal law, but
the statutes, constitutional provisions, and common law of that state. Even
though every state guaranteed the right to a jury trial for at least some criminal
charges, state law differed as to what that right entailed. This patchwork system of justice, with the state and federal courts following separate laws, sometimes resulted in striking differences in jury procedures. It was not until 1968
that the United States Supreme Court declared that the right to jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was an element of the “due process” safe17
guarded for all state citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, every
court, state or federal, was bound to provide defendants with at least those fundamental aspects of the jury trial embodied in the Sixth Amendment. The
Court explained in Duncan v. Louisiana:
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. . . .
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the
single judge, he was to have it. . . . The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of
jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement
qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and must therefore be respected by the States.18

Since Duncan, the Supreme Court has construed the Sixth Amendment to
dictate many aspects of the jury trial, such as juror selection procedures and

15. Id. at 26-33; see also Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 817-44 (1976)
(providing a historical account of the debate over vicinage and the Sixth Amendment).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
18. Id. at 155-56.
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jury size. Yet the Sixth Amendment does not regulate every detail of the
criminal jury trial in the United States. Individual state courts and legislatures
have considerable room to experiment with different jury procedures consistent
with the minimum protections of the Sixth Amendment, and have sometimes
expanded upon its guarantees, providing more protection than the United
States Constitution requires. The thousands of juries convened each day (over
20
ninety percent of them in state courts) are governed by hundreds of state constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules of varying complexity and content. Congress, too, has supplied a multitude of statutes and rules governing
jury trials in the federal courts, also supplementing the constitutional commands of the Bill of Rights. The federal constitutional declarations of the U.S.
Supreme Court, in other words, are only the common core of a much larger
body of jury law in the United States which varies significantly from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. A jury trial in California, for example, may be conducted quite
differently than a jury trial in Colorado. This state autonomy, particularly in
matters of criminal justice, continues to be fiercely defended against federal
control. State autonomy has made it possible for states to try out different jury
procedures over the years, supplying a rich source of empirical information
about jury reforms and techniques for other jurisdictions to adopt or decline.
The discussion of the American criminal jury in this article is therefore necessarily imprecise, sometimes providing a rough generalization of a common
practice instead of a detailed breakdown of variations in practice among the
21
fifty states and the federal courts. The following section outlines the core requirements of the Sixth Amendment and several of the most common procedural variations from the traditional common law jury.
IV
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND LOCAL
VARIATIONS
History has served as the Court’s guide in interpreting many aspects of the
jury right guaranteed by the Constitution. For example, although the Sixth
Amendment promises a jury “in all criminal prosecutions,” the Supreme Court
has not required courts to provide juries for “petty” offenses. Using the legislature’s chosen punishment as a proxy for seriousness, the Court has refused to
recognize a right to jury trial when the charge that the defendant faces carries a
penalty of six months or less, even when a defendant faces conviction on sev-

19. See infra Part IV.
20. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1997,
at tbl. 5.16 (1998) (noting that in 1995, there were approximately 3,150 felony jury trials in federal
court); id. tbl. 5.47 (noting that in 1994, there were over 51,000 felony convictions after jury trials in
state court).
21. This article also does not address the law governing jury trials in courts of military justice, juvenile courts, or Native American tribal courts.

KING.FMT4.DOC

Page 41: Spring 1999]

08/02/99 4:07 PM

A MERICAN CRIMINAL JURY

45

22

eral such charges in one trial. For a fine alone to trigger the right to a jury
23
trial, the amount must be quite substantial. In its decisions exempting petty
offenses from the jury trial right, the Court has repeatedly relied upon the his24
torical practice of trying petty offenses before judges without juries.
Tradition, however, was abandoned in other decisions interpreting the right
to a jury trial. One of the most fundamental changes in the scope of the jury
guarantee was brought about by the Court’s 1930 decision holding that the jury
trial was optional rather than mandatory in federal felony cases. Patton v.
25
United States gave defendants the option of dispensing with the jury and pro26
ceeding to trial before a judge alone. As a result, bench trials in felony cases,
27
rare at common law, are now commonplace.
The challenge of reconciling the variations and innovations in state practice
with the Sixth Amendment prompted the Court to authorize several other
modifications of the common law jury. The Court upheld Massachusetts’s twotier trial system in which a defendant received a jury only if he was first con28
victed by a judge. The Court also held that the Constitution does not require
that a jury rather than a judge make the decision to impose the death penalty or
29
to spare a capital defendant’s life. However, only a few states have chosen to
exclude the jury from the capital sentencing process and turn it over to judges
30
completely. In a handful of states, defendants retain the option even in a non-

22. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 332 (1996) (no right to a jury when charged with two
separate counts, each carrying up to sixth months’ imprisonment).
23. Compare Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975) (labor union fined $10,000 for a violation of
criminal contempt not entitled to jury trial), with International Union, UMW v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821
(1994) (fines of over $64 million imposed for contempt required jury trial).
24. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373,
379 (1966); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S.
65, 69-71 (1904).
25. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
26. See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (upholding a rule conditioning the defendant’s ability to waive a jury upon the consent of prosecutor and judge).
27. See Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 1, 1-10 (1995) (reporting data from thirteen states on the percentage of felony trials tried to the
bench: three states reported less than 10%, one reported over 77%, and nine ranged between 14% and
69%); Susan C. Towne, The Historical Origins of Bench Trial for Serious Crime, 26 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 123, 152 (1982).
28. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976). In 1978, Massachusetts changed its law so
that the first trial before a judge was optional, not mandatory. This modified law was upheld against a
double jeopardy challenge in Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294 (1984).
29. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (upholding judge’s decision to impose death
penalty after jury’s recommendation of a life sentence).
30. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(B) (1997); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (1997); MONT. CODE.
ANN. § 46-18-301 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1997). Four others leave the final determination of whether to impose the death penalty to the judge rather than the jury, but require the jury to
make a recommendation to the judge based upon its evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(c) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§i921.141 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (West 1997); see also NEV. REV. STAT.
§§i175.554, 175.556 (1997) (three-judge panel may decide sentence if jury cannot agree).
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capital case to have the jury pronounce the sentence, but elsewhere sentencing
31
by the judge is the norm.
To comply with the Sixth Amendment, a state felony jury may have as few
32
as six jurors, and it need not decide the issue of guilt or innocence with a
33
unanimous vote. Few jurisdictions have taken advantage of these streamlined
procedures, however. All but four states require that twelve jurors be seated
initially in noncapital felony cases (some allow for juror attrition during the
trial), and only Louisiana and Oregon allow nonunanimous verdicts in felony
34
cases. Recent proposals to allow for nonunanimous juries have surfaced again
in some localities, however, prompted by concern with the frequency of hung
35
juries.
While the Court has allowed for some narrowing of the safeguards provided
by the common law jury to criminal defendants, it has also erected jury trial
procedures for the benefit of the accused that did not exist at common law.
Like the constitutional requirements adopted in the mid-1900s for other phases
of criminal investigation and prosecution, these changes began as responses to
36
injustices suffered by African-Americans prosecuted in state courts. Particularly significant are the rules governing the selection of jurors. Elsewhere in
this issue, Professor Stephan Landsman examines in some detail the restrictions
on the exercise of peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause,
37
38
restrictions that originated in Batson v. Kentucky, a criminal case. The Court
has also held that the Constitution regulates the process by which potential ju-

31. Seven states permit some jury sentencing in noncapital cases. For a collection of citations to
state statutes, see WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.2(b) (2d ed. forthcoming).
32. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-member panel deprived defendants of his
right to trial by jury); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-member panel met due process requirements).
33. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); see also
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (discussing when unanimity is required regarding alternative
means of committing a single offense).
34. See DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL., STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1993, at 274-79 (1995) (stateby-state listing of jury size and verdict rules).
35. See, for example, the discussion of unanimity in the REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA BLUE
RIBBON COMMISSION ON JURY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT 70-79 (1996) (recommending a modified unanimity procedure in which a nonunanimous verdict of 11-1 would be permitted after the jury had deliberated for at least six hours, except where the punishment may be death or life imprisonment). See
also sources cited infra notes 145-146 (collecting hung-jury rates).
36. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 21 (1997) (“Several of the most
basic protections enjoyed by all Americans, for example, the right to an attorney when charged with a
serious offense, the right to be free of torture, and the right to a trial absent mob intimidation, are protections that arose in response to the racially motivated mistreatment of black defendants.”); Carol S.
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 838 (1994) (“The efforts of
twentieth-century judges to forge new connections in the Fourth Amendment between
‘reasonableness’ and warrants and to create a Fourth Amendment remedy of evidentiary exclusion
have been linked, both chronologically and ideologically, to attempts to address the larger problem of
racial injustice.”).
37. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
38. See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 293-95
(Spring 1999).
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rors are selected and summoned to the courthouse, a topic addressed sepa39
rately below.
Beyond these departures from the common law jury expressly addressed by
the Supreme Court, a host of other innovations have become well established.
In many states, jurors receive instructions about the case before the presenta40
tion of evidence. Jurors in many jurisdictions may take notes during trial and
review them during deliberations, although some courts continue to prohibit
41
note-taking. Some courts will allow jurors to submit questions to the judge to
be asked of witnesses, but this is not nearly as popular as the practice of juror
42
note-taking. Pattern jury instructions have for the most part replaced the
43
idiosyncratic jury charges of yesteryear. Most courts today issue the jurors
44
written copies of the jury instructions to take into the jury room. Unlike the
jurors of 1800 who were typically subject to sequestration—locked in the jury
45
room together, even overnight, until they reached a verdict —today’s jurors
46
are rarely sequestered. When a juror becomes unable to continue serving due
to illness or misconduct, the trial need not be aborted; many jurisdictions allow
the jury to continue deliberating with depleted numbers, and several jurisdic47
tions allow the substitution of juror alternates even during deliberations.
Another change from the traditional common law jury trial is the rule in
most states barring the trial judge from sharing his opinion of the evidence with
48
the jurors. Unlike the rule in many other countries requiring judicial com39. See infra Part VI.
40. See JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 151-53 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997) (discussing
preinstruction).
41. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256 (1996); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Note Taking and Question Asking During Trials, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1994); see also JURY TRIAL
INNOVATIONS, supra note 40, at 141-47. Louisiana still prohibits the use of juror notes in the jury
room. See LA. STAT. ANN. art. 1794 (West 1997).
42. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical Appraisal of a More Active Jury, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 229 (1990) (reporting survey of judges that revealed note-taking occurred in about one-third of trials, while permission to ask questions was reported in only one percent
of trials); see also Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1997) (discussing advantages, disadvantages, and
empirical information concerning juror questioning). Juror questioning apparently has “honorable antecedents in older English and American trials, but has fallen out of use in American jurisdictions.”
Michael E. Tigar, Foreword: The Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1970).
43. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 24.8(c) (discussing use of pattern instructions).
44. See Howard H. Lehman, A Critical Survey of Certain Phases of Trial Procedure in Criminal
Cases, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 754, 771 (1915); Annotation, 91 A.L.R.3d 382 (1979 & Supp. 1997).
45. See Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 2673, 2679-81 (1996).
46. See Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 63, 68 n.22 (1996) (noting that G. Thomas Munsterman, Director, Center for Jury Studies for the National Center for State Courts, estimates
that no more than 100 juries per year are sequestered during the trial period).
47. See, e.g., Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding substitution); see also
King, supra note 45, at 2749.
48. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 179 N.E. 898, 905 (Ill. 1931) (DeYoung, J., dissenting) (“A jury trial
in which the judge is deprived of the right to comment on the evidence and to express his opinion on
the facts . . . is not the jury trial which we inherited.”).
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ment on the evidence (known as “summing up”), this prohibition in the United
49
States is unique. Most states outlawed such comment in the 1800s by constitutional provision, statute, or judicial decision, although it is still an option in fed50
eral courts and in the courts in a minority of states. The ban is based on the
principle that the jury is the sole judge of the facts, combined with the traditional American distrust of the judiciary. In essence, most state legislatures
and courts have decided that the judge’s opinion of the evidence is at best ir51
relevant and meddlesome, and at worst, partisan advocacy. Even in jurisdictions where judges are permitted to comment on the evidence, they must be
52
careful not to give a “one-sided rendition” of the case. Indeed, at least one
recent study showed that American jurors may be deeply suspicious of judicial
53
comment on the evidence. In some ways, this rigid exclusion of judges from
factfinding complements the equally uncompromising exclusion of juries from
54
interpreting the law in all but a few states. Nevertheless, the no-comment rule
continues to be criticized by some as further “isolating” the jury laymen from
55
“learned guidance,” thus exacerbating the problem of juror misunderstanding.
Judicial influence over factfinding remains considerable despite nocomment rules. American jury trials involve complex and pervasive judicial
56
control of juries through the rules of evidence. A judge may not be allowed to
tell jurors what to deduce from the evidence they hear, but he can prevent them
from hearing it at all. Certain kinds of proof offered by the prosecution, for example, must be excluded in order to comply with constitutional commands.
Hearsay is inadmissible against a criminal defendant absent adequate indicia of
reliability, due to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that the accused be al57
lowed to “confront the witnesses against him.” Evidence seized in an unlawful search must be excluded in order to ensure that government agents live up
49. Cf. generally Symposium, The Common Law Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring
1999).
50. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 24.6(e) (collecting current state statutes, constitutional
provisions, and decisions); Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of
Judicial Evaluation of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 595, 622-27
(1985) (listing state-by-state the law first barring judicial evaluation).
51. See The Right of a Judge to Comment on the Evidence in His Charge to the Jury, 6 F.R.D. 317,
330 (1947); see also Krasity, supra note 50, at 611-12 (hypothesizing that the shift to elected judges may
have diminished the respect for judicial expertise regarding factual matters); Hon. Jack B. Weinstein,
The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and
Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161 (1988).
52. State v. Hernandez, 590 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1991).
53. See Dennis Turner & Solomon Fulero, Can Civility Return to the Courtroom? Will American
Jurors Like It?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 153-54 (1997) (finding, in mock trial study involving variations
on judicial comment, that judicial comment “did not find favor with the American jurors,” and that the
jurors had a “strong preference” that the judge not sum up the evidence).
54. See Krasity, supra note 50, at 620-21. On the role of juries in deciding law as well as fact, see
the discussion of nullification at infra Part V.
55. John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the
American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 202; Smith, supra note 42, at 538-47.
56. See generally John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from
the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1996).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).

KING.FMT4.DOC

Page 41: Spring 1999]

08/02/99 4:07 PM

A MERICAN CRIMINAL JURY

49

to the Fourth Amendment’s command that “the right of the people . . . against
58
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Statements of the
defendant are inadmissible when obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
right not to “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him59
self.”
Other incriminating evidence may be barred by statute or court rule for fear
that the jury would be unable to assess its proper weight and relevance, such as
60
evidence of other bad deeds by the accused. Still other exclusions are meant
to encourage the litigants to engage in remedial activities or settlements, such
61
as the rule barring the admission of statements made during plea negotiations.
Evidence offered by the defense, too, may also be excluded on the grounds that
62
it is unreliable or irrelevant. Juries judging guilt or innocence are not allowed
to hear evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual history, for example, or to learn
63
about the punishment a defendant faces upon conviction. Intoxication, insanity, duress, and other defenses are carefully regulated by the judge and often by
64
statute. As in civil trials, a judge in a criminal case may in some circumstances
exclude a witness’s testimony or other evidence as a sanction for a party’s fail65
ure to comply with rules of pretrial discovery. The Supreme Court has held
that even a defendant may be precluded from presenting the testimony of a
66
witness whose name defense counsel deliberately failed to list prior to trial.
For example, readers who followed the trial of O.J. Simpson may recall both
sides arguing over the sanction of exclusion for alleged failures to disclose witnesses and other evidence prior to trial.
In addition, the judge serves as the gatekeeper for technical, scientific, and
other expert testimony, allowing the jury to hear such evidence only after de67
termining that the testimony will assist the jury in finding the facts.
In
68
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court established
a framework within which federal judges must evaluate expert evidence. This
69
formula has been adopted by several state courts as well. One recent study of
58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (3d ed. 1996).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, ch. 6.
60. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404.

A TREATISE

61. See, e.g., id. 410.
62. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (noting that “the accused does not have an
unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under
standard rules of evidence”).
63. See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 412 (limiting evidence of victim’s past sexual behavior); Rogers v.
United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975) (noting that “the jury had no sentencing function and should
reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed”); United States v. Davidson, 367
F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1966) (discussing ban on juror consideration of punishment).
64. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES (1984).
65. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 20.6.
66. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 415-16.
67. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
68. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
69. See, e.g., Joseph R. Meaney, Note, From Frye to Daubert: Is a Pattern Unfolding?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 191 (1995) (listing states following Daubert).
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three cities found that about six of every ten criminal trials includes expert tes70
timony. Occasionally, a defendant will raise as a defense a claim that he was
suffering from insanity or some other mental impairment, a claim that usually
will necessitate testimony by mental health professionals. The insanity defense,
71
however, is raised infrequently and is rarely successful. Acquittals due to insanity probably make up no more than about 0.26% of terminated felony
72
prosecutions. Expert testimony may also be presented by a defendant who
claims that her actions were the reasonable response of a person suffering from
battered woman syndrome or any of a variety of other mental or emotional
conditions. Prosecutors in sex offense cases sometimes present expert testimony concerning child sex abuse syndrome or rape trauma syndrome in order
to help the jury understand the behavior of alleged victims. Experts on eyewitness identification have testified in a number of cases as well, although many
73
courts continue to exclude such testimony as unhelpful.
V
JURY NULLIFICATION
74

As illustrated by the Zenger trial, jurors in criminal cases do not always
follow the instructions given to them by judges. When their failure to follow
the law results in conviction, a defendant may appeal the conviction, and in
turn may receive a new trial. However, when jurors depart from the law to acquit, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the defen75
dant from being retried for that crime. This power of the jury to disregard the
law and to acquit a defendant accused of a crime, even when the proof at trial
demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is known as “jury nullification.”
As noted above, nullification provided a shield against British oppression before the Revolution. American juries have, since colonial times, exercised leniency by acquitting against the evidence and law in cases in which a conviction
76
would be followed by a mandatory death sentence. Before the Civil War, antislavery juries nullified in cases in which defendants were charged with treason
for resisting the enforcement of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law, a draconian stat77
ute enacted to assist slave owners in recovering runaway slaves. Following the

70. See Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the
Courts—Part III: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 204 (1994).
71. See Hugh McGinley & Richard A. Pasework, National Survey of the Frequency and Success of
the Insanity Plea and Alternate Pleas, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 208-14 (1989).
72. See Andrew Blum, Debunking Myths of the Insanity Plea, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at 9.
73. See Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness Reliability Before
and After Daubert: The State of the Law and the Science, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 229 (1995).
74. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
76. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).
77. See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE
SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860, at 148-69 (1968); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY

KING.FMT4.DOC

Page 41: Spring 1999]

08/02/99 4:07 PM

A MERICAN CRIMINAL JURY

51

war, Southern juries refused to convict those accused of violence against African-Americans, and in Utah, Mormon jurors refused to convict defendants
78
charged with bigamy or polygamy. Prohibition era juries refused to convict
liquor law violators, Vietnam War era draft-dodgers escaped punishment
through acquittals, and jurors today may be nullifying in cases involving police
oversight or abuse, lengthy mandatory sentences, charges of assisted suicide,
79
drug possession, or the use of firearms.
Ever since the ratification of the Constitution, judges and scholars have debated whether nullification is good or bad, whether it is a right or a de facto
power, and what courts can and cannot do to control it. For some, nullification
80
“is what the jury system is about.” For others, it is a necessary cost of allowing the jury unfettered freedom to find facts, and of protecting an acquitted de81
fendant from the ordeal of a second trial. The Supreme Court has avoided entering this controversy directly for more than a century. Its last significant
discussion of nullification appeared in an 1895 decision denying a criminal defendant’s claim of entitlement to an instruction about a lesser-included charge
that was unsupported by the evidence, a decision in which a majority of the
Court sternly disapproved of such jury lawlessness and declared that it was the
82
role of the judge, not the jury, to determine the law.
While the debate continues about how much leeway jurors should be given
to reject judge-directed law, there is no question that the Constitution now
prohibits some judicial efforts to restrict nullification. The Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars retrial after acquittal for the same of83
fense, and the Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to
prohibit judges from entering a judgment of conviction absent a jury’s verdict
84
of guilt in cases where the defendant has not waived a jury trial. A court may
not bar a defendant from litigating anew a factual issue decided previously
85
against him. And most courts consider special verdicts, by which a jury is
asked to find the facts so that the judge can apply the law and determine guilt
86
or innocence, to be unconstitutional.
At the same time, numerous limitations on the jury’s nullification power
thrive in criminal courtrooms, indicating either that the power is quite narrowly

AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 191 (1975); JANE
SLAVE LAW AND ANTHONY BURNS (1975).

H. PEASE & WILLIAM H. PEASE, THE FUGITIVE

78. See Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the
Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 461-64 (1998).
79. See id. at 433-34, 466; Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 890-92.
80. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
95 (1995).
81. See King, supra note 78, at 444-58 (reviewing origins and explanations of jury nullification).
82. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
84. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84 (1983); Sparf, 156 U.S. at 105.
85. See United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994); Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Note, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379 (1994).
86. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 24.9.
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confined, or an ambivalent judicial commitment to that power, or both. Federal courts remain free to retry a defendant acquitted by a state jury, as may the
court of a different state, on the theory that when a defendant violates the law
of more than one “sovereign,” each sovereign may exact its own punishment
87
regardless of what another sovereign chooses to do. For example, following
the state acquittals of the police officers charged with beating AfricanAmerican motorist Rodney King, the federal government successfully prose88
cuted the same officers under federal law. Also, a defendant’s sentence for a
crime of which he was convicted may be based on the commission of another
89
offense of which he was acquitted. A “civil penalty” may follow a criminal
acquittal as well, even when the penalty looks suspiciously like a fine for the
90
same wrongdoing.
In addition, trial judges take pains to prevent nullification from occurring.
Potential jurors who reveal during jury selection that they have doubts about
the law are regularly excused for cause, and jurors exposed as nullification advocates during deliberations may, in some instances, be removed from the
91
jury. Judges routinely prevent defendants from introducing evidence or argument to support defenses that are not authorized by law, although occasionally a sympathetic judge may permit defense counsel to hint at a forbidden reason for the jury to exercise leniency, such as the steep punishment a defendant
would face if convicted. Defendants are almost without exception denied instructions that will inform jurors that they have the power to acquit even when
92
they believe that a defendant may be guilty under the law. Instead, judges are
allowed to instruct the jury that it must convict if the government proves each
93
element of the crime charged with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As the
Court held in 1895, defendants are not entitled to instructions informing the
94
jury of a lesser-included offense unless the evidence supports that charge.
Judges may require a jury to deliberate further if it returns with an acquittal on
87. See id. § 25.5. A state may also prosecute a defendant for the same offense after acquittal in
federal court.
88. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
89. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
90. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (holding that double jeopardy does not bar
the imposition of civil and criminal penalties for the same offense). At least one court has authorized
the retrial of a defendant should the prosecutor prove that the defendant bribed his judge to acquit
him. See Aleman v. The Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir.
1998). While it would be a simple matter to confine this exception to the finality of acquittals to bench
trials without intruding on the sanctity of jury decisions, the Court has so far refused in its double jeopardy cases to extend less protection to acquittals by judges than to acquittals by juries. See United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1977); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100,
133-34 (1904).
91. See King, supra note 78, at 484-85; see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir.
1997) (reviewing case in which judge during trial dismissed juror alleged to have been misbehaving and
refusing to follow instructions, noting that trial judges have the duty to dismiss jurors who intend to
nullify).
92. In Indiana and Maryland, however, the state constitution permits juries to determine both the
law and the facts. See IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19; MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 23.
93. See King, supra note 78, at 475 n.158.
94. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 59-64 (1895).
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one count that is inconsistent with its verdict on another. And sometimes
judges ask jurors to answer special interrogatories along with their verdict of
guilt or innocence—factual questions that may focus the jury on the legal issues
as presented by the judge and away from extra-legal reasons for acquitting the
96
defendant such as conscience or prejudice.
Judges and legislators refuse to give the criminal jury any more discretion
than this because they are concerned that greater leeway would free jurors to
misuse their power. A juror may vote to acquit a defendant because she believes that the conduct proscribed by the charge is not a crime, that the defendant does not deserve punishment, that the police acted in bad faith, that God
would not punish the defendant, that the victim needs no protection from the
law, that she will earn a personal benefit if she acquits, that the defendant or
those who support his innocence will harm her if she votes to convict, that the
Constitution requires fingerprint evidence to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, or for any other reason at all. It is not so long ago that jurors refused to punish those responsible for torturing and terrorizing African97
Americans throughout the South. Those wary of nullification recognize that
criminal jury trials today may still involve victims who are unpopular yet deserve protection, or laws that, while opposed in some communities, reflect the
will of the state or the nation. It is in these types of cases that the jury’s decision to refuse to enforce the law can be most disturbing. In any event, as Professors Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel’s classic study of American juries dem98
onstrated, judge/jury disagreement is the exception, not the rule.
Most
acquittals are probably due to genuine doubts about the facts, rather than overt
99
disregard for the law.
VI
JURY COMPOSITION
Given the ability of jurors to block the enforcement of criminal law, it was
inevitable that the identity of those who sit in the jury box would be a subject of
intense controversy. The Sixth Amendment gave little guidance, insisting only
that the jury be “impartial” and drawn from a “previously ascertained”
“district,” leaving plenty of room for courts and legislatures to define further
100
the qualifications for service as a juror.
Until the Civil War, federal courts
followed the juror selection procedures of the state in which the court was located, and all but one of the states effectively limited jury service to white men
95. For a full discussion of inconsistent verdicts and their treatment by courts, see Eric L. Muller,
The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771
(1998).
96. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 24.9.
97. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
98. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (1966) (noting that in
sample of 3,576 trials, judges agreed with jurors in over 75% of cases).
99. See id. at 116.
100. See Kershen, supra note 15, at 843.
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101

who were property owners or taxpayers.
Often local statutes would require
that jurors be of “intelligence” or “of fair character,” requirements judged exclusively by those men charged with the job of creating jury lists. These men,
called sheriffs, trustees, or selectmen, would choose the initial names to be
102
summoned, with virtually no check on their discretion. When not enough of
those enlisted for jury service responded to their summonses, or showed up
103
drunk or sick, bystanders were chosen to make up the remainder.
By manipulating the initial list, local officials could attempt to stack a jury with sympathizers, while a defendant could do the same by trying to control who showed
104
up and who was standing around to take the place of no-shows.
Following the Civil War, Congress prohibited states from disqualifying citizens from jury service on account of race, and for a short time during Recon105
struction, African-Americans served on juries in some communities. But the
right of African-Americans to serve on juries in most Southern communities
remained unrealized: Their names were rarely on jury lists, and when they
106
were, they were never selected. The Court’s efforts to remedy this persistent
practice began in 1880. Striking down an express statutory exclusion of Afri107
can-Americans from juries, the Court in Strauder v. West Virginia concluded
that the statute denied equal protection of the law to the African-American defendant who must submit to a trial by a jury from which all members of his race
had been excluded. But the Court’s decision served only to shift discrimination
from the text of statutes to the actions of those who enforced them. Keeping
juries all-white remained business as usual well into the twentieth century. The
names of African-Americans were essentially “nailed to the bottom” of the
108
boxes, if they appeared there at all. Courts occasionally ordered relief after
finding that nothing else but race discrimination could explain the total absence
of African-Americans on juries over several years, rejecting claims that no
qualified African-Americans existed or that those in charge did not know any.
Yet, as Professor Randall Kennedy has pointed out, bringing such a challenge
was not a realistic option for most defendants: Even for those defendants able
to afford an attorney, attorneys remained “dependent on the good will of
whites,” and were “unwilling to jeopardize their careers” by challenging dis-

101. Although only three states explicitly limited service to whites, other limitations effectively ensured all-white juries. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 877; see also KENNEDY, supra note 36,
at 169 (“Prior to the Civil War, only one state, Massachusetts, permitted blacks to serve on juries.”).
102. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 879-80; see also JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION
PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 86-88 (1977)
(cataloguing continued use of “key-man” jury selection systems in several states in the mid-1970s).
103. See King, supra note 45, at 2682.
104. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 879-80; King, supra note 45, at 2682-85.
105. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 886. For further discussion, see Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33
EMORY L.J. 921 (1984).
106. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 877.
107. 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
108. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 895.
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109

criminatory practices.
In addition, state judges rarely recognized the prac110
tices in their own courts as unlawful. Eventually, after the United States Supreme Court overturned the convictions of several defendants convicted by allwhite juries during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s due to intentional race discrimination, state courts began to attempt to include African-Americans in jury
pools. Even then, officials in some communities made sure to summon only as
111
many as were necessary to avoid a successful legal challenge.
A system for selecting jurors randomly from voter lists was adopted by
Congress in 1970, freeing federal courts from the more discretionary state jury
selection schemes and eliminating the exemptions for certain professions which
112
had skewed jury pools in the past. But in interpreting the commands of the
Constitution, which bind the states, the Court stopped short of mandating random selection. The Court refused to hold unconstitutional the key-man jury
selection system that allowed state jury commissioners to select those potential
jurors they felt were most qualified. Instead, the Court held in 1975 that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees only that juries be drawn from a “cross-section”
113
of the community. If a defendant could show that a cognizable group in the
population was underrepresented on the venire, he deserved a new trial unless
the state could show that the underrepresentation was due to a selection proce114
dure that advanced a significant state interest. Although the cases that established this doctrine involved the exclusion of women from juries, the crosssection concept was immediately employed to combat racially discriminatory
115
selection practices.
Subsequent cross-section and equal protection chal116
lenges, together with the court systems’ acquisition of computer technology,
led states to adopt random selection procedures and remove from commission117
ers the discretion to pick and choose among qualified potential jurors.
Today, in nearly every American jurisdiction, the names of citizens who are
mailed summonses for jury service are selected randomly, by computer, from
118
lists of registered voters or licensed drivers.
109. See KENNEDY, supra note 36, at 174.
110. See id.
111. As late as the 1970s for example, attorneys and jury commissioners in Putnam County, Georgia, had conspired to minimize the number of African-Americans and women on the county’s jury lists.
See id. at 180 (describing Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988)).
112. See generally Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Invention, 6 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 247 (1973).
113. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
114. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1979).
115. See Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945, 968 n.111 (1998).
116. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (finding that a statistically significant gap between the proportion of Mexican-Americans in the adult population (79.1%) and the proportion of
those summoned for grand jury duty in the preceding 11 years (only 39%) was enough to establish intentional discrimination on the part of those jury commissioners responsible for summoning jurors).
For more on the cross-section challenge under the Sixth Amendment, see Leipold, supra note 115.
117. For a discussion of state reform efforts, see G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State
Jury Reform Efforts, 79 JUDICATURE 216 (1996).
118. See id. at 216.
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But random selection has not resolved the ongoing litigation over the composition of juries—far from it. First, random selection highlighted the discrimination that occurred later in the selection process during the voir dire stage.
Getting a representative group of prospective jurors into the courtroom was a
big step. Ensuring diversity in the jury box was something else. Through peremptory challenges, attorneys could use whatever criteria they wished to tailor
the jury pool in their favor—race, sex, ethnicity, you name it. Batson and the
119
cases extending the ban against race-based peremptory challenges followed.
A decade of experience with the Batson rule has demonstrated its futility, how120
ever, causing some scholars and judges to suggest the elimination of the per121
emptory challenge altogether. Unlike the challenge for cause, which is necessary to ensure the defendant the “impartial” jury guaranteed by the
Constitution, the peremptory challenge is not protected by the Constitution
122
and is not an essential element of the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.
The peremptory challenge is thus subject to elimination by legislatures. Already, efforts have been made in some states to reduce the number of peremptory challenges provided to each party. Presently, eight states allow four challenges or fewer per side, five states allow twelve or more challenges, and the
123
rest fall somewhere in between.
Critics of the peremptory challenge argue that not only does the challenge
permit, and perhaps even encourage, invidious discrimination against potential
jurors, it causes jurors to become “frustrated and cynical about the justice sys124
tem.” The challenge, claim some critics, also wastes time and promotes reliance on “jury experts,” which, in turn, exacerbates the imbalance between parties who possess unequal resources to pay for such services. Actually, trial
consultants offer such a wide variety of help with trial presentation and strategy
that the elimination of the peremptory challenge may not have much of an effect on the market for their services. Expert assistance on how to present evidence, clients, and witnesses to a particular jury during jury selection and the
remainder of trial will continue to be useful to attorneys, even if peremptory
challenges were unavailable.

119. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
120. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996).
121. See, e.g., id.; Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Raymond J. Broderick,
Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809
(1997).
122. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586
(1919).
123. See COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JURY PROJECT, JURIES FOR
THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND (1998) [hereinafter YEAR 2000].
124. Id. at 29 (quoting Hoffman, supra note 121, at 862, “Is it any wonder that these people leave
our courtrooms thinking that the whole trial process is just as trivial and flawed as jury selection?”).
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Jury reformers sometimes point to the successful eclipse of the peremptory
challenge in other countries as evidence that the same could be accomplished
125
here.
But the ability of other nations to shed the challenge does not necessarily portend an easy transition in the United States. Other countries may
enjoy conditions more favorable to this change, including a history of less litigant autonomy during voir dire, more effective regulation of trial publicity,
more homogenous jury pools, and widespread acceptance of nonunanimous
verdicts. Should the peremptory challenge erode in America, it is likely that
litigants would attempt to make greater use of challenges for cause. Presently,
challenges for cause are employed in most trials; an estimated fifteen to twentyfive percent of potential jurors brought to court for each criminal case are ex126
cused for cause.
If the challenge for cause were expanded to allow for dis127
qualification of jurors for bias that was less obvious or clear, the frequency of
challenges for cause would undoubtedly increase.
Two additional constitutional regulations of the voir dire process deserve
mention. First, the Court has held that there is a right to ask potential jurors
about racial bias in a very narrow class of criminal cases raising racially sensi128
tive issues. Second, in capital cases, the Court has held that the defendant’s
right to an impartial jury is violated when the prosecutor excludes for cause jurors who are opposed to the death penalty but nevertheless are able to impose
129
it. As a result, questioning of potential jurors in capital cases typically is quite
130
detailed.
However, other than these required inquiries and the ban against
the intentional use of race and gender in exercising peremptory challenges, the
Court has imposed very few constitutional constraints on the voir dire process.
It has refused to recognize a constitutional right to question potential jurors
about the extent of their exposure to pretrial publicity, for example, insisting
only that the judge assure himself that the jurors could “put aside what they
131
had read or heard and render a fair verdict based on the evidence.” Thus, the

125. See Alschuler, supra note 121, at 166-67.
126. Usage will vary with the individual case and the jurisdiction. See Telephone Interview with
Paula L. Hannaford, Senior Research Analyst, National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.
(Oct. 23, 1998).
127. See, for example, YEAR 2000, supra note 123, at 35, proposing that peremptory challenges be
abolished, but that cause challenges be
expanded to mandate the exclusion of any juror as to whom any reasonable doubt exists
about the juror’s impartiality, based on either the juror’s demeanor or substantive answers to
questions during voir dire; and where a trial judge is uncertain regarding the existence of such
a reasonable doubt, the judge’s uncertainty should be resolved in favor of striking the challenged juror.
128. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (requiring an inquiry of potential jurors in capital
cases as to whether they would automatically impose a death sentence after a guilty verdict); Turner v.
Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (requiring an inquiry about racial bias in prosecution of African-American
defendant charged with murder of a white victim); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973)
(requiring an inquiry about racial bias in prosecution of black civil rights activist).
129. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); see
also infra notes 183-184.
130. See infra Part IX.
131. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 432 (1991) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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trial judge still has almost complete control over the amount of information
litigants will learn about jurors during voir dire. Some judges allow attorneys
great leeway to question (and begin indoctrinating) jurors; others do not allow
the attorneys to question the prospective jurors, preferring instead to pose a
minimum number of quite general questions from the bench. In complex or
high-profile cases, courts may allow the use of detailed written juror questionnaires as a supplement to in-court questioning. This permits the jurors somewhat more privacy, facilitates the disclosure of more information about jurors,
and conserves judicial resources. Some commentators have recommended that
132
questionnaires be used routinely due to these advantages.
With the widespread adoption of random selection systems, concern about
discrimination shifted not only to later phases of jury selection, but also to an
earlier stage of the selection processes: the creation of the juror lists themselves. In some courts, critics have claimed, the geographic boundaries of the
community from which jurors are drawn create racially skewed jury lists due to
the persistence of residential segregation. An example is the controversy recently resolved in the federal court for the Eastern District of New York, a district divided into two predominately white counties on Long Island and the
three more racially diverse boroughs of Queens, Bronx, and Brooklyn. Out of
concern for the difficulties faced by lower-income residents living in the city
who had to find transportation to courthouses on Long Island, the five-county
district had for years drawn jurors for its two Long Island courthouses exclusively from the two Long Island counties, while jurors for other courthouses
133
were drawn from all five counties. Recently, this system came under attack.
Defendants tried in Queens, Bronx, or Brooklyn alleged that their juries were
diluted with whites from Long Island, while defendants tried on Long Island
alleged that they were deprived of minority jurors from the rest of the Dis134
trict.
After considering several alternative proposals to alleviate racial imbalances, the court eventually abandoned trying to carve up its racially polarized vicinage and adopted a plan which drew jurors for all courthouses from the
135
entire District.
Concerns about racial representation in jury pools have also caused some
litigants, judges, and lawmakers to question whether otherwise random and
race-neutral procedures for summoning and qualification actually exclude a
disproportionate number of minority citizens. Studies have shown that in some
communities, minority citizens are statistically less likely to appear on lists of
132. See YEAR 2000, supra note 123, at 34; Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123 (1996).
133. See In re Jury Plan of the Eastern District of New York, 27 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1994).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bhana, 68 F.3d
19 (2d Cir. 1995).
135. See In re Jury Plan of the Eastern District of New York, 61 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 1995); Nancy J.
King, Jurymandering Is Asking for Trouble, NEWSDAY, Sept. 22, 1994, at 36; Susanne H. Vikoren, Justice or Jurymander? Confronting the Under Representation of Racial Groups in the Jury Pool of New
York’s Eastern District, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 605 (1996); see also United States v. King, 134
F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 1998).
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voters or licensed drivers, to remain at one address long enough to receive a
jury summons, or to be able to obtain transportation to the courthouse or time
136
off from work to serve as jurors. To compensate, many jurisdictions are considering adding to their juror source list the names of those who may not be licensed to drive but who pay income tax, receive public assistance, or have re137
cently become American citizens.
A few courts have experimented with
“oversampling” minority neighborhoods or other efforts to achieve racial bal138
ance in the jury pool.
The federal court in Detroit, Michigan, for example,
replicated on the list of qualified jurors the racial demographics of the population from which the list was drawn by striking the appropriate number of nonAfrican-Americans. However, the Court of Appeals recently found that such
139
racial “balancing” was unconstitutional, and the District has discarded the
140
system.
VII
THE CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL: AN EMPIRICAL SNAPSHOT
No discussion of the American criminal jury would be complete without
some mention of how seldom those charged with crime in the United States actually face a jury, yet how influential the jury remains. For most defendants,
the jury, if not irrelevant, is at least inaccessible. A remarkably small percent141
age of felony cases go to trial, only three to ten percent. Plea bargaining or
“settlement” is the norm, due to powerful incentives to avoid the risk and expense of trial, incentives that influence both prosecution and defense. In more
than a third of the small percentage of felony cases that are tried, the defendant
142
opts for trial by a judge without a jury. As Professor Albert Alschuler states,
“American criminal procedure has become an administrative process rather
143
than the adjudicative process it once was.”
But even though only a tiny proportion of defendants are willing or able to
submit their fate to juries, the jury retains importance in other ways. Attorneys
settling cases often try to predict whether a jury would convict or acquit, bargaining in the shadow of the jury. While juries actually convict in two-thirds to
three-quarters of all felony cases submitted to them, the conviction rate varies

136. See Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 712-14 (1993).
137. See, e.g., YEAR 2000, supra note 123, at 8.
138. See King, supra note 136, at 723-24.
139. See United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir. 1998).
140. See Tim Doran, Ruling Puts a Roadblock into Federal Jury Selection, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Mar. 17, 1998, at 3B (reporting that “[t]he U.S. District Court in eastern Michigan agreed to stop removing non-blacks from jury pools”).
141. See BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 48 (1995).
142. See id. (noting figures for state courts).
143. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 8, at 925.
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144

considerably depending on the type of crime.
Only about three percent of
145
federal criminal cases tried to a jury end in hung juries; in some localities, that
146
percentage is higher.
The justice system continues to devote a hefty portion of its resources to
maintaining the criminal jury. Trial judges spend a significant amount of time
trying criminal cases, and appellate judges expend considerable time reviewing
them. In the federal courts, for example, although criminal case filings represented only thirteen percent of all cases filed in 1994, forty-two percent of all
147
trials were criminal trials, and most of those were jury trials. Jury administration costs to each court system include the expense of preparing and updating
juror lists and pattern jury instructions, juror fees (up to fifty dollars per day in
148
some jurisdictions, but in many states, much less), jury administrators’ salaries, jury summoning and qualification mailings, proceedings to enforce jury
149
summonses, jury education programs, juror meals, and, for some cases, the
150
cost of sequestering the jury during deliberations.
Although criminal trials are much longer and more complex than the several-a-day trials of centuries past, they are still quite short. Nationwide, each
felony jury trial takes about two to four days to complete, not weeks or even
months as recent (and unusually lengthy) murder trials such as that of O.J.
151
Simpson or Louise Woodward might suggest. Complex, multi-defendant, or
capital cases take longer to try than most felonies. The jury selection phase of a
felony case can last less than an hour or can drag on for several days, but on av152
erage seems to take up about twenty to thirty-five percent of total trial time.
Often parties will not use all of their allotted peremptory challenges. Batson
objections to these challenges are quite common in some courtrooms, rare in
many others. During the government’s case-in-chief, the prosecution typically
presents several witnesses, often including a police officer or the crime victim,
144. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 20, tbl. 5.28 (1997); OSTROM & KAUDER,
supra note 141, at 50. For a thorough statistical profile of trials, and other steps in the criminal justice
process, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 1.3.
145. See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About Jury Decisions?, 6 S.C. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 40 (1997) (collecting hung jury statistics in federal criminal jury trials from 19801993).
146. See Roger Parloff, Race and Juries: If It Ain’t Broke . . . , AMERICAN LAWYER, June 1997, at 5
(collecting statistics on acquittal rates and hung jury rates, finding that acquittal rates vary greatly, and
that hung jury rates in Los Angeles have remained between 12% and 16% for over a decade).
147. See David L. Cook et al., Criminal Caseload in U.S. District Courts: More Than Meets the Eye,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1578, 1591 (1995).
148. See Munsterman, supra note 117, at 217.
149. See, e.g., YEAR 2000, supra note 123, at 5-6 (describing use of juror orientation video and recommending program to improve public attitudes toward jury service).
150. Until it abandoned mandatory felony jury sequestration in 1996, the State of New York was
spending more than $4 million annually just to house and supervise sequestered jurors in criminal
cases. See THE JURY PROJECT, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 13
(1994).
151. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998) (noting trial lasted three
weeks).
152. See DALE ANNE SIPES ET AL., ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS 40
tbl. 18 (1988).
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and in many cases will call an expert to the stand to assist the jury in evaluating
evidence concerning illegal substances, firearms, wounds, injuries, physical
conditions, or fingerprint, DNA, or other forensic analysis. The defendant may
choose not to present any witnesses at all, opting instead to impeach the credibility of the government’s witnesses. When the defense does present testimony,
153
it usually takes up less time than the prosecution’s case.
The criminal jury trial plays a prominent role in the nation’s psyche as well
as its budget. Many believe, or at least believed at one time, that one of the
jury’s primary functions is to educate citizens in democracy through their par154
ticipation as jurors.
Yet most Americans will never have the experience of
deliberating as a juror. Each year, about one-quarter to one-half of the estimated twenty million individuals who receive jury qualification questionnaires
155
in the mail will be exempted, disqualified, or excused from serving.
Others
156
will be summoned but will not show up. Less than half of those who do ap157
pear for jury service will become sworn jurors in any case, criminal or civil.
Some citizens experience juries as defendants, witnesses, attorneys, or court officers. A far greater number of Americans learn about criminal juries second158
hand, schooled about the criminal jury through media accounts of jury trials.
Criminal jury trials continue to be front-page, box-office, best-seller material
year after year, and now are even available on their own cable channel, Court

153. For information on the length of trials, see id. Criminal jury trials in federal court average in
length about four and one half days. See Cook et al., supra note 147, at 1592-93. On the types of evidence submitted in felony trials in several urban courts, see SIPES ET AL., supra note 152; Dale Ann
Sipes & Barry Mahoney, Toward Better Management of Criminal Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE 29, 34
(1988) (reporting that while a typical prosecution in Oakland and Marin Counties in California involved at least one expert witness and three officials (police officers, etc.), prosecutors in other urban
areas studied used only two officials and rarely used experts); see also OSTROM & KAUDER, supra
note 141, at 50 (reporting that actual trial time for a typical felony jury trial in the cities they studied
averaged 11 hours and that the prosecution consumed about twice as much time as the defense).
154. See, e.g., Vikram Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 239 (1995).
155. See G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, JURY SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 47 (National Center for State
Courts 1996).
156. See id.
157. These figures vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, in Washington, D.C.,
of those summoned for jury service, 19% purposely ignored their summonses, and 43% never received
it through the mail. See YEAR 2000, supra note 123, at 1. Other jurisdictions report near-perfect compliance. See King, supra note 45, at 2697 n.89 (collecting response rates ranging from over 93% to less
than half of those summoned). The National Center for State Courts recommends that courts design
their jury systems so that no more than half of the jurors reporting go home without being sworn in as
jurors. See Munsterman, supra note 155, at 86 tbl. 7-1.
158. See SUSANNA BARBER, NEWS CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM: A FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL
DEBATE xiv (1987):
Though television is only one source of citizens’ knowledge about courts and law, it may well
be the single most common and pervasive source of shared information and imagery. . . .
[T]ypical viewers of prime time dramatic network programs will see 43 law enforcers, 6 lawyers, and 3 judges every week—all fictional but realistically portrayed. They nearly all work
on criminal cases. . . . The legal process is practically invisible . . . . Viewers rarely see arraignments, indictments, pre-trial hearings, plea-bargaining, jury selection, or jury deliberations.
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159

TV. This endless supply of dramatic highlights of real and imaginary prosecutions is, for much of America, the only source of information about the
160
criminal jury.
VIII
PUBLICITY AND THE JURY
The American public has always been fascinated by crime and criminals,
eagerly consuming news of crime before, during, and even after a prosecution.
In the United States, as in other countries where the jury is employed, the jurors’ views of a case may be influenced by media accounts of the crime, the victims, or the alleged perpetrator, including information that would not be admissible at trial. As elsewhere, this kind of influence can threaten the
impartiality of the jury and the legitimacy of its decision. But in America, the
fear of the influence of publicity on verdicts is more pronounced than in other
countries. For example, whatever prejudices English jurors may bring with
them to the jury room are assumed in that country to cancel each other out in
161
the decisionmaking process. Not so in the United States.
Jurors’ exposure to publicity can be fatal to a verdict. Judges and attorneys
often take great care to empanel jurors who have not heard much about the
162
case and to protect those jurors from publicity during the course of the trial.
The intensified concern about media taint in the United States may be due to
the greater potential for such influence. Unlike the law of other countries,
American law does not control the effects of publicity on jurors by barring the
press from disseminating information about a criminal case before and during a
163
trial. Such restrictions, even if they could be effective in the age of the Inter164
net, are contrary to the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech. A
defendant’s inadmissible confession or prior record, the details of the victim’s
loss, legal pundits’ speculation about the trial and sentence, reports of rulings
made outside the hearing of the jury, and other inadmissible information may
be freely broadcast into the homes and delivered to the doorstep of every juror
and potential juror prior to and during the trial. The Constitution guarantees
the press access to trials as well as the freedom to report whatever it learns,
forbidding exclusion of the press except when “necessitated by a compelling

159. See PAUL THALER, THE WATCHFUL EYE: AMERICAN JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE
TELEVISION TRIAL 3-6 (1994).
160. See id. at 6-10.
161. See Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries and Jury
Reform in England and Wales, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 25 (Spring 1999) (noting that “[t]he
defence has practically no information on which to base . . . a challenge and no right to ask potential
members of the jury exploratory questions”).
162. See King, supra note 45, at 2729; Strauss supra note 46, at 83-88.
163. See Lloyd-Bostock & Thomas, supra note 161, at 28-31.
164. See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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governmental interest,” and by means “narrowly tailored to serve that inter165
est.”
Instead of the media, then, it is the jurors, together with the judge, who
carry the burden of keeping the trial process free from information untested in
the crucible of trial procedure. Jury selection is expected to screen adequately
those potential jurors whose exposure to publicity has left them irreparably in166
fluenced, even though the result may be a jury stripped of people who stay in167
formed about the greater world around them. At times, an entire community
may be saturated with outrage, suspicion, or rumor, so that jurors who lack
strong views about a case are hard to find. In such cases, a judge may order a
168
change of venue to a different location. Jurors who are chosen are expected
to follow the court’s instructions not to pay attention to media accounts or
other discussions of the case during the trial, subject to dismissal from the jury
should they disobey. In some cases, a court may keep the names and addresses
of jurors from the press and even from the parties, to relieve juror anxiety
about being approached by parties, witnesses, sympathizers for one side or the
169
other, or by reporters.
After the trial, free speech principles continue to influence a judge’s ability
to regulate jurors. For example, judges cannot issue gag orders preventing jurors from seeking out members of the press and telling all about their delibera170
tions.
At most, a court might be able to prohibit the press and others from
approaching hesitant jurors and pressing them for information about their se171
cret deliberations after the trial.
Despite all of these protections for the press, and the impression one might
get by watching the television news, the vast majority of criminal trials in the
United States go forward quietly, without attorneys giving press conferences on
the courthouse steps, without debriefings on nightly television talk shows, and
without cameras broadcasting live courtroom events. Most criminal trials are
covered only by local press, if at all. Many courtrooms in the United States still
lack video recording equipment. Although several states have installed such
equipment and also allow for television coverage, other courts continue to ban
cameras or audio recording equipment in the courtroom, allowing access only

165. Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1986); Globe Newspaper v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 55 (1980).
166. See Press Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 14.
167. Barring news consumers from juries is, in Jeffrey Abramson’s view, “rabidly antidemocratic.”
ABRAMSON, supra note 80, at 248.
168. For an in-depth look at a change of venue controversy, see Laurie L. Levenson, Change of
Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533 (1993) (discussing the state prosecution of the officers charges with beating motorist Rodney King).
169. See King, supra note 132, at 130-32.
170. See Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389 (1994).
171. See United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding, against First Amendment challenge by press, trial judge’s mandate that, “absent a special order by” the judge, “no juror
may be interviewed by anyone concerning the deliberations of the jury”).
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172

to representatives of the print media.
Attorneys, too, are barred in many
states by rules of professional conduct from commenting in any detail about
their trials, a restriction that has been upheld by the Supreme Court as consis173
tent with the First Amendment.
IX
THE CAPITAL JURY: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY
One of the most unique tasks of the criminal jury in the United States is de174
ciding whether a convicted criminal will be put to death for his crime. Presently, the federal government and about three-quarters of the states have
authorized the death penalty, and in most of these states the jury, not the judge,
175
decides whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. The Court has
interpreted the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” in the
Eighth Amendment to bar the imposition of the death penalty except for the
most serious crimes, so that today essentially only murderers are sentenced to
death. Hence, capital jury trials are relatively uncommon. Of the 2,000 to
4,000 defendants a year charged with a crime that makes them eligible for the
death penalty, only about six to fifteen percent receive a death sentence, an av176
erage of about 250 death sentences per year.
For much of American history, jurors were given little, if any, guidance as
to how they should decide who would live or die, and judges had little power to
review a jury’s sentencing decision. As Professor Randall Kennedy has vividly
portrayed in his book Race, Crime, and the Law, capital trials in the United
177
States have been plagued by racial injustice.
The death penalty was employed frequently in cases in which African-American men were convicted of
178
179
raping white women, for example.
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court attempted to put a stop to arbitrary death sentencing. The decision struck down dozens of state sentencing schemes as violative of the Eighth
180
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Within five
years, however, the Court upheld revised state sentencing statutes that were
designed by state legislatures to ensure that the death penalty would be im181
posed in a more consistent, yet more individualized manner.
In dozens of
172. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,
752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
173. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
174. For a complete listing of which nations authorize the sentence of death, see THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 78-83 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1997).
175. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 26.1(b), 26.3(b).
176. See ABRAMSON, supra note 80, at 213-14; THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 174,
at 31-32.
177. See KENNEDY, supra note 36.
178. Eventually, the Supreme Court in 1977 held that the death penalty was an unconstitutionally
severe punishment for the crime of rape. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
179. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
180. See id. at 239.
181. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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subsequent decisions, the Court has continued to map out the complex proce182
dures required by the Constitution in order to impose the penalty of death.
A brief summary of those procedures follows.
The trial of a person charged with a capital crime has two separate stages:
the determination of guilt or innocence, and the selection of a sentence. Only
after the guilt-or-innocence phase ends with a verdict of guilt does the jury hear
evidence concerning the appropriate sentence. Yet because the same jurors
who decide the sentence also decide guilt, the questions during voir dire often
focus on the sentencing decision. Potential jurors are carefully interrogated
about their attitudes about the death penalty. While many of these potential
jurors will have never thought seriously about capital punishment before, others will voice strong, sometimes religiously based views for or against capital
punishment. For nearly two centuries, those potential jurors who revealed conscientious scruples about sentencing someone to death, or who were otherwise
opposed to capital punishment, were struck from the juries in capital cases “for
cause.” In 1968, the Court found that this practice violated the defendant’s
183
rights to due process and to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.
Today, potential jurors who cannot impose a sentence of death and thus lack
the capacity to apply the law are subject to disqualification for cause, but those
who might be able to sentence someone to death (and are simply reluctant to
184
do so) are qualified to serve. Government attorneys nevertheless strike such
moderate opponents of the death penalty from capital juries when they can
with peremptory challenges. Indeed, both parties in capital cases are usually
allotted more peremptory challenges than in noncapital cases, ostensibly to
provide greater assurance that the jurors who remain on the panel are fair.
The sentencing phase of a capital case is a trial-like, adversarial hearing
during which the parties present evidence of certain aggravating or mitigating
factors. The government and the defense may present information about the
character of the convicted defendant and, in many states, the jurors are exposed to victim-impact evidence. Jurors are instructed that they must unanimously agree that specified aggravating factors have been established beyond a
reasonable doubt before they can impose a death sentence. For these jurors,
the process of deciding whether to sentence a defendant to death is always a
trying, and often a confusing, ordeal. A mammoth study involving lengthy interviews with hundreds of people who have served as jurors in death penalty
185
proceedings has revealed that jurors often misunderstand what will happen to
the defendant if they decide not to impose the death penalty, believe that their
decision is merely advisory, or misunderstand which factors can and cannot be
182. For useful discussions of the death penalty and the jury, see ABRAMSON, supra note 80, at 20739, and Jordan Steiker, The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94 MICH L.
REV. 2590 (1996).
183. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
184. See id.
185. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1077-85 (1995) (describing study).
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considered, what level of proof is required, and what degree of concurrence is
186
required for aggravating and mitigating factors.
The dozens of decisions fine-tuning the death sentencing process have failed
to dispel the belief, still held by a significant percentage of Americans, that the
187
death penalty is imposed in a racially discriminatory manner.
In 1987, lawyers seeking to overturn the death sentence of Warren McCleskey, an AfricanAmerican man convicted of murdering Frank Schlatt, a white police officer,
presented studies that many believed demonstrated that the race of the victim
188
consistently influenced capital sentencing decisions in Georgia. In particular,
defendants convicted of killing whites were much more likely to receive the
death penalty than those who murdered African-Americans. The Court assumed the studies were valid, but refused to overturn McCleskey’s sentence absent proof that the decisionmaker in McCleskey’s case discriminated on the ba189
sis of race.
The Court’s decision in McCleskey prompted the House of
Representatives to endorse a federal statutory remedy for capital defendants
whose statistical evidence of discrimination could not be rebutted by the state,
190
but the bill failed to pass the Senate. Studies continue to suggest that prosecutors are more likely to seek, and jurors more likely to impose, the sentence of
191
death if the victim of the crime was white.
The problem of how to remedy
discrimination in capital cases continues to confound courts and critics, dividing
them into those who favor removing discretion entirely through either mandatory death sentences or the abolition of the death penalty, and those who seek
192
to maintain, but somehow limit, sentencing discretion.
X
CONCLUSION
The jury system in America took root in the midst of political conflict between those who served as jurors and those who served as judges. Today,
judges in the United States are either elected by the people or appointed by
elected officials; they are no longer agents of a foreign nation. Still, jurors and
judges continue to disagree, coming from different backgrounds, with different
attitudes about crime, about police, and about those who file in and out of witness boxes. Juries regularly surprise the system’s insiders, sometimes through
186. See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury: Is It Tilted Toward Death?, 79 JUDICATURE 220
(1996).
187. See, e.g., Dan Smith, Death Penalty Supported in State, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 14, 1997, at
A3 (stating that 40% of respondents polled in California believe racial discrimination is a “big factor in
the application of the death penalty”).
188. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
189. See id. at 312-13.
190. See KENNEDY, supra note 36, at 345-48.
191. See David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 385, 397-403
(James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
192. See id.
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dramatic verdicts, sometimes in other, less momentous ways, such as the juror
who one day, presumably out of frustration with the repetitive nature of the
evidence, brought a sign with him to court that read, “[w]e got it the first
193
time,” the juror who holds out for acquittal against the rest, or the juror who
wants a question asked of the witness. Clearly, an independent spirit lives
within some American jurors.
As juries become both less common and more expensive, some have ques194
tioned the wisdom of preserving the criminal jury in its present form.
The
benefits of the jury are difficult to quantify, but jury verdicts continue to earn
widespread acceptance by the public and trial by jury remains a cherished right
of most Americans. In any event, many basic features of the criminal jury in
the United States cannot be modified without either constitutional amendment
or radical reinterpretations of the Bill of Rights. Judges and legislators continue to tinker within constitutional confines, some hoping to improve the jury
trial by helping jurors deliberate more carefully, others hoping to improve the
speed and flexibility of jury trials, still others hoping to promote greater juror
participation. Ultimately, the success or failure of any jury reform will depend
on its ability to accommodate those values unique to American criminal justice:
a fierce attachment to adversarial advocacy, respect for state autonomy, an improving sensitivity to racial equality, the expectation of jury independence from
judicial control, and a deep commitment to freedom of speech.

193. See Malpractice Suit Jury Impatient, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 21, 1997, at 4B (reporting
that a juror brought two signs into court, one said, “We got it the first time” and the other said, “Stop
the Insanity”).
194. See, e.g., Parloff, supra note 146 (noting efforts to scrap unanimity requirement).

